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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ROGER HAINES, JR.*
In defense of the Relevant Conduct section of the Sentencing Guidelines, I
would like to make three points: one of the charges that has been leveled
against the Guidelines is that they are not individualized, and do not allow for
individualized sentencing. But any fair sentencing system has to take into
account more than the elements of the offense. Even in state guideline schemes
that do not have a relevant conduct guideline, it is understood that in
sentencing within the state range the judge will consider the individual factors
of the defendant, including how much harm he caused, and what his prior
record is. All these factors are laid out in the Federal Guidelines. So if you
examine these state systems, you will see that in order for a sentencing system
to be perceived as fair, it has to take into account some “real offense” factors.
The real complaint against the Guidelines is not that they consider “real
offense” factors, but that they ordinarily prevent the judge from considering a
defendant’s “specific offender characteristics,” that is, the defendant’s family
background, youthfulness, drug addiction, et cetera. The reason the Guidelines
generally bar these factors is that in the pre-Guideline era you had some judges
who always ate hard-boiled eggs for breakfast and others who had them “over
easy.”1 That is, some judges thought youth was a mitigating factor, while
other judges thought youth was an aggravating factor, because youthful
offenders tend to recidivate most often. Likewise with addiction, some judges
felt that addiction was a mitigating factor. But other judges would say addicts
are more likely to recidivate, so they considered addiction an aggravating
factor. The Sentencing Commission, I think very wisely, took the middle
ground, deciding that judges generally cannot consider these “specific offender
characteristics” at all, because these are the factors that have caused the most
disparity among district judges. In short, it was proper for the Commission to
include “relevant conduct” and to ordinarily exclude “specific offender
characteristics,” because both of these decisions enhance the “fairness” of the
guidelines.
My second point is about due process. It has been suggested that the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard allows judges to sentence defendants

* Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California. Member, U.S. Attorney General’s
Advisory Committee on Sentencing Guidelines. These views do not necessarily reflect the
position of the United States Department of Justice.
1. Editor’s note see Professor Michael Goldsmith’s comments, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 394,
394-95 (2000) in this issue.
416

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

IS “RELEVANT CONDUCT” RELEVANT?

417

based on unreliable evidence. But ask any district judge, when was the last
time he or she relied on evidence despite doubts about its reliability, simply
because of the preponderance of the evidence standard. The judge would
answer, “Never.” This is because judges try to do justice. If they have
substantial doubts about relevant conduct, they simply do not include it,
regardless of the “preponderance” standard. One indication of this is that there
are very few reversals on appeal for unreliable evidence. So the standard of
review really does not make much difference. I submit that the “tail is not
wagging the dog.”
Thirdly, a question was asked whether drug quantity and fraud loss should
drive the Guidelines. For drugs, I think the answer has been stated here many
times; as long as there are statutory mandatory minimums, quantity will drive
the drug Guidelines. The same is probably true for fraud cases, because it is
difficult to find any other single factor that so captures the harm caused by
fraud. With regard to “relevant conduct,” however, it is important to
remember that if you are convicted of a fraud “scheme” or a drug
“conspiracy,” the so-called “relevant conduct” is actually part of the offense of
conviction. It is not “relevant conduct” at all. Thus, in “conspiracy” or
“scheme” cases, it is not the “relevant conduct” that increases the sentence—it
is the offense conduct itself. The other cases—where relevant conduct is used
to increase the sentence of a defendant who is not convicted of a conspiracy or
scheme—are a small part of the total number of drug and fraud cases.

